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WHITE POLITICS : CONSTRAINT OR OPPORTUNITY?
INTRODUCTION
The context within which political conflict plays itself out in
South Africa has changed dramatically since FW de Klerk's speech
to the opening of parliament on 2 February this year. The wide-
ranging announcements have impacted on all political actors
operating both within and outside the country. For the white
political parties in South Africa, one of the consequences of the
speech has been the disturbance of the traditional alignments
and relationships between them. Some analysts now argue that
South Africa has already seen Its last white election and
conclude that not only has the Conservative Party no chance of
ever gaining power, but that the Democratic Party must Inevitably
crumble under the pressure of an accommodation between the NP
and the ANC. Gerrit Viljoen's recent statement that the NP was
"not very likely to be In control" in ten years time reinforces
this line of analysis (Citizen 7 February 1990).
These are some of the conventional wisdoms colouring the current
perspectives of "white" politics. This paper takes issue with
some of these perspectives by examining the dimensions of the
fluidity In white politics and evaluating the potential role
that changing white political orientations may play in the newly
emerging politics in South Africa. The analysis of the likely
trends in white politics is based on the election and referendum
results during the decade of the 1980s. White political
attitudes remain an important factor especially since F.W. de
Klerk has committed himself to holding either a referendum or an
election to endorse any new constitution.
The National Party's victory in the September 1989 election
represented its tenth consecutive electoral victory since its
assumption of power in 1948. This performance in the retention
of power over some four decades has, however, been qualified by
the narrowing of its base of support during the 1980s. With the
exception of the 1970 election results, the NP had managed to
Increase its parliamentary majority and Its share of the vote
with every election, such that in the 1981 election It achieved a
record 98 seat majority. By 1989 this majority was slashed to
22 seats under the impact of resurgent opposition on both flanks.
Utilizing Its prerogative to select its own nominees for the
majority of the appointed parliamentary positions, the NPs
parliamentary majority has been increased to a somewhat more
comfortable level.
Nonetheless, the NP finds itself in the historically curious
position of having to interpret its mandate (real or presumed)
more extensively than any mandate has been exercised before in
South Africa, and it has to do this on the basis of a smaller
margin of electoral power than at any time since 1953
THE NATIONAL PARTY'S MANDATE
The NP's mandate is based on its 1989 five year "Plan of Action"
which incorporates most aspects of both its 1987 Programme of
Principles and its 1987 Manifesto. The NP's overall objective,
as stated broadly in these documents, includes the achievement of
a democratic system, no group domination, a free enterprise
economy, independence of the judiciary and the maintenance of
safety, civilized norms and good international relations.
More specifically, the NP commits itself in its 5-year plan to,
inter alia, the following goals:
* the initiation of negotiations with the "recognized leaders
of all groups committed to the pursuit of peaceful
solutions" about the "political, social and economic systems
for a new South Africa";
* the establishment of institutions in which leaders of all
groups can participate in creating a new system;
* the reassessment of the functions, powers, role and election
of the head of state in a new system;
* the acceptance of one citizenship for all South Africans;
* the promotion of common values "without inhibiting" group
identity;
* freedom of association and disassociation; protection of the
right of groups to maintain their own identity and values
and giving "content to the overall juridical and structural
protection of groups in constitutional structures";
* self-determination regarding "own affairs" together with
joint decision-making on "general affairs" by means of the
division and devolution of power;
* the recognition of the right of self-governing territories
either to independence or to remain part of and participate
in the political Institutions in South Africa.
In his speech on the 2nd of February, FW de Klerk restated the
Government's aim to be the Introduction of a new, democratic
constitution with the protection of minority and Individual
rights, as well as the Implementation of "dynamic programmes
directed at better education, health services, housing and social
conditions for all". (Sowetan 5 February 1990).
The NP's mandate, strictly Interpreted, thus implies some form of
consociation. It also implicitly assumes the continuation of the
NP's role in executive government, on the strength of the fact
that the NP is assumed to remain the dominant vehicle for the
representation of white minority interests. For the average NP
voter, the mandate presumably entails support for more than
merely a "passive" protection of minority rights - it entails
support for an active role for minorities in government. The
mandate furthermore assumes that the NP will retain control
during the process of transition to the "new South Africa".
While the NP is thus far clearly operating within its mandate in
terms of the issues mentioned above, it may well be on the verge
of over-extending its mandate on a number of further issues. In
the first place, the NP appears to be changing its emphasis from
a rather strict definition of group rights in terms of ethnic and
racial criteria, to less formalistic, and possibly ambiguous
definitions of such rights. Reference has been made to
"collective", "minority", and "national" rights, rights based on
voluntary association, and all In combination with "individual"
rights. The categorical Implications of "groups rights" are
steadily being softened. Furthermore, specific definitions or
descriptions on the part of the NP of these rights are at present
being deferred until the Law Commission's enquiry into the means
of giving expression to such rights has been completed. The
President's Council is also investigating these issues. The
precise position of the NP on minority or group rights for the
moment thus remains somewhat blurred.
From the ANC's perspective, on the other hand, although cultural
rights are recognized and accommodated in several of Its policy
documents, its position makes no provision for the mobilization
of minority participation in either political parties or through
constitutional provisions for group (however defined)-based
power-sharing. The polarization of the NP and ANC positions on
"group" or minority rights implies that some fairly substantial
compromises will have to be made on both sides on this question
if a mutually agreeable position is to be worked out. This
realistic assumption has obvious implications for the electoral
mandate of the NP.
The NPs approach to the conditions in terms of which
organizations may participate in negotiations is a second
problematic area. The NP's position has evolved from one which
emphasises a rejection of the participation of any organization
which supports violence to a more positively worded emphasis on
accepting the participation of any organization expressing a
committment to the achievement of peaceful solutions.
The unbanning of the ANC and other organizations by the
government was clearly aimed at removing obstacles in the way of
those organizations participating in the process of negotiations.
The subsequent reaffirmation by the ANC and the PAC of a
committment to the armed struggle on the part of their most
senior spokesmen stretches to its limit the NP's room to
manoeuvre within its mandate to promote negotiations. The ANC's
reiteration of a committment to armed struggle appears to be
interpreted by the NP as either a face-saving exercise or as an
understandable reserve strategy until such time as sufficient
confidence that negotiations will indeed get off the ground, has
been built up. The statements of Mandela and Sisulu in other
words are being interpreted by the NP as judiciously worded or
elliptical committments to peace and thus still justifiable in
terms of the NP's mandate with regard to pursuing negotiations.
The NP may however, not be able to sustain this operating
assumption in the face, of continuing violence in the country for
any length of time.
A further potential problem area is that while the NP's 5-year
plan assumes continued NP control during negotiations, the ANC,
in its Harare Declaration, has called for the formation of an
interim government to oversee the process of drawing up a new
constitution, govern and administer the country and effect the
transition, including the holding of elections. Thus, the NP
might be within its stated mandate, but obviously precariously so
in terms of the future implications of current developments.
The justification of the NPs claim to be operating within its
mandate is crucial if it is to successfully avoid calling
another election before its 5 year term of office formally
expires. The NP therefore has to perform a very delicate
balancing act in order to achieve a negotiated outcome within 5
years without manifestly exceeding the limits of its own
electoral mandate.
The issue of the electoral mandate is important since it lies at
the heart of the CP's attempts to prevent the NP from pursuing
its policy as regards negotiation. The CP's tactic in the
aftermath of the unbanning of the ANC, the SACP and the PAC has
been to call into question the mandate which the NP says it has
for such steps and, more importantly, to thereby challenge the
legitimacy of the NP's actions. Ultimately the CP hopes to use
this lever of claimed legitimacy to force the NP to resign or to
defend its actions in another election. This-would then provide
the CP with what it sees as its final opportunity to win an
election.
CP resistance to the NP's policies takes various forms. At an
organisational level it has embarked on a campaign of mass
meetings and rallies across the country designed to raise its
level of support from the 680 000 votes it received in the
September election to one million firmly secured supporters on
the basis of a membership drive. This campaign is planned to peak
in late May with the handing over of a one million signature
petition to the authorities. The campaign is thus aimed at
drawing support away from the NP and to the CP based on the
assumption that the CP is able to gain further substantial
support over and above its September election showing.
The major focus of the CP campaign is its attempts to
demonstrate that the NP has totally changed its policies as
regards the ANC and the SACP since the publication of its five
year plan. It argues that the NP has both allowed itself to be
deceived by the ANC*s leading spokesmen' and that it entirely
misunderstands the nature of the events in Eastern Europe during
the last year and the true nature of glasnost in the Soviet
Union.
At its most direct the CP argues that the NP has deceived the
voters since its publications during the election promised that
the ANC would never be allowed to operate legally in SA for as
long as it retained the armed struggle as a feature of its
strategy. The reaffirmation by Nelson Mandela in speeches since
his release of the importance of the armed struggle is contrasted
by the CP with these election statements. (Patriot 9 February
1990) Less insidiously, the CP also argues that the NP's campaign
gave no indication to the voters that such far-reaching steps
were being contemplated. It therefore argues that many voters who
voted for the NP in 1989 would not have done so had they known
what the party was actually preparing to do.
The CP substantiates its argument that the National Party has
been deceived by the ANC and the SACP by referring to Mandela's
statements since his release. Dr. Treurnicht has described Mr.
Mandela's reputed committment to peace as a "transparent
deception" in the light of literal interpretations of his words.
Treurnicht further argues, on the basis of such literal
interpretations, that Mandela remains wedded to the "full
programme of classical marxism" (Patriot 16 February 1990).
The importance of this line of attack by the CP is that by
portraying Mandela as a hypocrite, the CP implies that not only
has the NP government been duped by organisations which have no
committment to finding peaceful solutions, but that the NP*s
recent actions amount to "capitulation before revolution". Put
another way, the CP accuses the NP of having "finally and
unambigiously taken the side of the ANC against the Afrikaner
nation" (Patriot 16 February 1990).
Finally, the changing international context within which South
African politics plays itself out, particularly the events in
Eastern Europe and Soviet Union, also features prominently in the
debate between the NP and the CP. As FW de Klerk's speech to
parliament demonstrated, the NP argues that this changing context
has provided the framework within which socialist policies can
effectively be countered. (Sowetan 5 February 1990)
In common with some conservative and neo-conservative groups in
the western world, the CP remains sceptical regarding the
significance of glasnost and perestroika. Treurnicht denies that
glasnost necessarily means the end of Stalinism or that the
Soviet Union has abandoned any claims to world domination.
Instead, the CP's most significant reading of the events of the
last year in Eastern Europe is that the separatist initiatives in
the Baltic states and elsewhere are convincing proof of the
durability of the forces of volksnaslonalisme (Patriot 9 February
1990).
A leading CP spokesman has incidentally disputed the comparisons
often made between FW de Klerk, and Mikhail Gorbachev as being
similar in their roles as reformers and has rather drawn a
parallel between De Klerk and Kerensky as figures who pave the
way for the real revolutionaries to take over the centre
political stage.
The CP's persistent questioning of the NP's mandate for its
actions has forced the NP to respond. Its defence takes three
forms. In the first place FW de Klerk denies that the NP's
election campaign did not "lay a clear basis...for the steps it
is taking now". Yet he admits that the specifics of the recent
policy decisions "were not spelled out" to the electorate in the
election campaign. But he claims that no political party does
this. For example he says the NP committed itself during the
campaign to removing obstacles for negotiation and to create a
climate in which negotiation partners could be free to pursue
their own viewpoints. (Citizen 10 February 1990)
The second form of defence is to argue that "circumstances had
changed dramatically" since the election and that this changed
dispensation "alone requires and justifies fully the new strategy
and approach" (Citizen 10 February 1990). This is a clear
reference to the international context within which South African
politics takes place and is viewed by the outside world.
The third justification against the CP's attack is to argue that
in the context of iminent negotiations the NP has to keep its
options and positions close to its chest. Stoffel van der Merwe,
a member of the NP's negotiating team, argues that the NP would
"risk being criticised as acting one-sidedly and prescriptively
if it were at this stage to spell out its vision of the political
future of South Africa" (Patriot 16 February 1990). In other
words a certain latitude is claimed to present and change
policies as these are deemed needed.
Clearly the issue of the mandate is going to be yet more fully
exploited by the CP in the coming months. The cogency of the
argument and its utility in gaining support for the CP at the
cost of the NP can be argued to depend on two issues. The first
is that in any climate, or even perceived climate of
deteriorating law and order there is an obvious possibility that
sections of the white electorate will choose to blame the NP for
creating the conditions under which radical movements were free
to forment resistance. The second is the obverse of the first:
should international political opinion and extra-parliamentary
responses be seen to be becoming more accommodative of the NP
government and reasonable symbolic progress is made towards a
resolution of conflict, then the issue of the mandate becomes all
the less relevant.
The ultimate outcome of the CP's campaign in this regard, and the
NP's rejoinders, depends on the inevitability cruder
interpretations and perceptions of the rank-and-file voters.
Hence the challenge and counter-challenge must be assessed in the
light of likely responses by the electorate, to which we now
turn.
PROSPECTS
A brief review of the results of the 1989 election for the House
of Assembly is given below to provide the broad dimensions of the
current political orientation of the white South African
electorate. These results are then compared with the results of
the previous two elections - in 1987 and 1981 and the 1983
referendum results - in an attempt to highlight the shifts that
have taken place in white political affiliation during the 1980s
and the estimate the size of the reform and resistance-oriented
support bases amoung the white electorate.
From Table 1 it is clear that the dominant shift in white
political party affiliation during the 1980s was one to the right
wing of the political spectrum. Between 1981 and 1989 the NP
lost 38 seats to the CP's gain of 39 seats. The liberal
opposition share of the vote (PFP/NRP/DP) appears to have
remained fairly constant over the decade with the exception of
1987 when support on the left wing of the political spectrum
dropped quite substantially. In an election closely following
the countrywide upheavals between 1984 and 1986 this result
suggests a latent cohesion among the white electorate in a
situation of perceived threat. Once the immediacy of this
threat had been contained following the introduction of the State
. of Emergency, white political sentiment appeared to relax,
allowing a more generous response to political reform. The
political upheavals of the 1980s added a dimension of reaction to
perceived threat which complemented ethnic and class interests in
forming a block of white political opinion on the right which has
solidified with the framework of CP policy.
TABLE ONE
SEATS : HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY (AS ELECTED DURING GENERAL ELECTIONS)
PFP/DP/NRP/IND NP CP/HNP
1981 34 132
1987 21 123 22
1989 33 94 39
Difference 81-89 (-1) (-38) (+39)
While the percentage of the right wing party vote increased from
15,5 in 1981 to 31,6 in 1989 (i.e. doubled in strength) (see
Table 2), its major growth appears to have taken place between
1981 and 1987. Between 1987 and 1989 it only grew by 1,7
percent. This allowed the argument to been made that the right
wing of the political spectrum has reached a ceiling in its
potential for further growth (Simpson, 1990: 8-9). In over 40
constituencies, the CP's percentage share of the vote dropped
between these two elections. An alternative view, however, would
be that specific circumstances in the 1989 election served to
restrict its growth temporarily and that under new conditions its
growth could resume.
TABLE 2
TOTAL PERCENTAGE SHARE OF VOTE BY PARTY : 1981 - 1989
PFP/DP/IND/NRP NP CP/HNP
1981 27,5 57,0 15,5
1987 17,4 52,7 29,9
1989 20,1 48,2 31,6
GROWTH/DECLINE
1981 -
1987
1987-
1989
1981-
1989
PFP/DP/IND/NRP
-10,1
+2.7
+7,4
NP
-4.3
-4,5
-8,8
CP/HNP
+14,4
+1,7
+16,1
In both the Cape and Natal, CP strength remains at under 20
percent of the total provincial vote whereas in the Transvaal and
Free State CP support stands at 40 percent or more. (See Table
3). Both CP and DP support are thus at this stage fairly
substantially regionally based whereas the NP's support is more
widely spread.
TABLE 3
TOTAL PERCENTAGE SHARE OF VOTE BY PARTY BY PROVINCE
PFP/DP/IND/NRP NP CP/HNP
CAPE 1981 31,4 59,1 9,5
1987 21,8 60,7 17,4
1989 28,8 53,7 17,5
(-2,6) (-5,4) (+8,0)
TVL 1981
1987
1989
NATAL 1981
1987
1989
21,8
12,9
13,9
(-7,9)
57,7
39,1
42,4
(-15,3)
58
48
45
(-12,
37
50
44
(+6,
,2
,6
,8
4)
,4
,2
.0
6)
20,0
38,5
40,3
(+20,3)
4,9
10,7
13,6
(+8,7)
OFS 1981
1987
1989
1,8
1,6
2,4
(+0,6)
73,0
55,8
50,9
(-22,1)
25,2
42,6
46,6
(+21,4)
Looking at the 1989 DP seats (see Annexure 1) It is clear that
the DP only won 2 new seats if we exclude seats that were either
PFP or NRP seats in the 1981 election: North Rand and Randburg.
North Rand was won by the DP with only 43 percent of the vote,
i.e. if the CP had not put up a candidate in North Rand it is
possible that the seat would have remained an NP seat. In
Randburg, despite the DP candidate being the MP who had won the
seat previously as a Nationalist, the DP share of the vote was no
higher than 53 percent.
Liberal opposition performance improved most between 1987 and
1989 in the upper middle class northern Durban constituencies,
the Cape Peninsula and some of the newer upper middle class
perimeter constituencies around Johannesburg. Earlier in the
decade, between 1981 and 1987, the liberal opposition share of
the vote had declined markedly in two specific categories of
constituences. In the generally lower middle class
constituencies in southern Durban and southern Johannesburg, the
liberal opposition share of the vote dropped by more than 20
percentage points. The same trend applied to the Natal South
Coast constituencies. Yet in areas where there has been a rise
in rightwing support during the 1980s, especially on the East and
West Rand and in the eastern Pretoria constituencies, the DP
share of the vote dropped between 5 and 12 percentage points over
earlier levels achieved by the NRP and the PFP. Tactical voting
to prevent a split of the anti-CP vote may account for some of
the decline in liberal opposition support in these areas
(Humphries 1989: 20).
Of the 17 new seats won by the CP in 1989 (see Annexure 2), 8
would have been won by the CP in 1987 had the right wing vote not
been split by the presence of a HNP candidate. A more valid
reflection of rightwing gains in 1989 therefore amounts to some 9
seats and of these seats, Ladybrand and Meyerton were won with
less than 50 percent of the vote due to the presence of a DP
candidate in the constituency. Growth of support for the CP in
areas in which they were expected to make headway was relatively
limited. In the Vaal Triangle CP support grew by only 0,9
percent, on the West Rand by only 1,1 percent while on the East
Rand CP support actually declined. However, since 1987 CP growth
has developed in areas not traditionally right wing strongholds,
such as the border and northern Cape regions, Bloemfontein,
southern Durban and southern and central Johannesburg.
Although the CP did not win more than 61 percent of the vote in
any constituency, the fact that the NP did not succeed in winning
back any marginal seats won by the CP in 1987 suggests a
consolidation of CP support despite its relatively low percentage
levels.
Research by Pretorius (1989) into the growth potential of the CP
in terms of correlations between demographic and economic
profiles of the electorate and political party support suggests
that right wing support in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand region is
predominantly found in constituencies where there are high
proportions of Afrikaans speaking blue collar voters. These
correlations thereby confirm other indications that right wing
support may have a finite ceiling at around 33 percent of the
white electorate, at least under the political conditions which
held before 1990.
With the lapse of time since the 1989 election, the NP's 22 seat
majority suggests a relatively comfortable governing majority.
This may be misleading for two reasons: the diminishing size of
the NP majorities in the context of a loss of support to both the
CP and the DP and, secondly, victories derived as a result of a
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split vote in constituencies in which all three parties stood.
Twenty-four NP seats were won with less than 50 percent of the
vote as a result of the vote being split three ways. On the same
basis the NP lost 6 seats to the DP and 2 seats to the CP. In
only 29 constituencies did the NP's share of the vote increase
between 1987 and 1989. In all other constituencies the NP's
share of the vote diminished. The NP implicitly recognized the
narrowness of its electoral victory in its interpretation of the
election result: De Klerk claimed majority support for reform-
oriented policies by aggregating the NP and DP share of the vote
and contrasting it with the 30 percent CP share of the vote.
The white electorate thus seems to be relatively volatile in
terms of its present political party affiliations. If, however,
conditions in the political environment remain stable, several
indications point to there being a limit to the growth potential
of the CP. Even if one assumes that in a next election the CP
were not only to hold on to all its current seats but were to win
all seats marginal to it within majorities of 1500 votes, its
limit would then be a total of some 70 seats - not enough for an
outright electoral victory.
A graphical representation of the results of the 1981, 1987 and
1989 elections together with the 1983 referendum (see Table 4 and
Figure 1), confirms that a tapering off of right wing growth
occurred in the second half of the 1980s. The right wing's
greatest growth appears to have occurred not between 1981 and
1987 but between 1981 and 1983, as we have said, - i.e. a
relatively strong surge of growth followed by a much slower rate
of growth between 1983 and 1987. Using the referendum as a basis
for predicting future CP support, which Simpson does, restricts
future growth to those categories of NP voters who voted "no" in
the referendum, but who have so far remained loyal to the NP.
Table 4 illustrates this point.
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TABLE 4
BREAKDOWN OF WHITE PARTY ALLEGIANCE DURING THE 1980s
1981 1983 1987 1989 1989
PFP/NRP
PFP
PFP/NRP
NRP
NP
NP
NP
NP
NP
HNP
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
PFP/NRP
PFP/NRP
NP
NP
NP
NP
NP
CP/HNP
CP
CP
DP
DP
DP
NP
NP
NP
CP
CP
CP
CP
7,0
10.2
3.4
5.5
41.2
1.3
1.4
6,0
9.6
14,4
DP
20,6
NP
48,0
CP
31.4
Source: Simpson 1990: 13
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FIGURE 1
1989
DP
1987
PFP/NRP IND
1983
L-NO
NP
NP
YES
1981
PFP NRP NP
CP HNP
CP HNP
R-NO
nil •
HNP/NCP
Source: Laurie (1987: 263) (1989 results added)
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A further interesting aspect of the graphic is the minority
response by PFP voters (35 percent of its 1981 support level) to
the official PFP call for a "no" vote in 'the 1983 referendum. A
majority of PFP supporters thus seem to have supported the NP's
1983 constitutional reform proposals. From this is would appear
that the NP could have the latent support of a further 14 percent
of the electorate on the left of the political spectrum, at least
in terms of its political reform initiatives (giving it a maximum
support of a total of some 62 percent of the electorate). Since
the principle involved in the 1983 referendum was the extension
of the existing political system to incorporate Coloureds and
Indians, it can be assumed that a similar principle with regard
to Blacks would enjoy at least the same degree of support in
1989.
How the electorate would however respond to reforms in terms of
which it would find itself in the position of, or potential
position of, a political minority is not clear. If the 1983
leftwing "no" vote is anywhere near to being an indication of the
degree of white support for some form of "majority rule", then it
can be assumed that white support for such reform would be
restricted to a minority of the white electorate.
What we are suggesting is that the model on the basis of which
the right wing is argued to have a ceiling may not be appropriate
in the political uncertainties which lie ahead. It is vital to
note that at no previous stage since the NP began to (grudgingly)
adopt reform postures in the 1970s, has the white voter been
allowed to experience any uncertainty about the NP's intentions
to guard the full spectrum of white interests. The interplay of
political prospects has changed however, and one must assume that
the growth potential of the right wing may also be modified.
One of the constraints on right wing growth has been its regional
or provincial concentration. Under changing over-arching
political prospects, this constraint may be weakened. Grobbelaar
(1989:22) argues that any growth of rightwing support in the Cape
Province is likely to be limited because- of the "verlig"
tradition of Afrikaner nationalism there as opposed to the
"verkramp" tradition in the northern provinces and because Cape
nationalism is underpinned by different material conditions: "The
headquarters of many of South Africa's established Afrikaner-
dominated conglomerates are still to be found in the Cape, e.g.
Rembrandt and Sanlam."
Other factors help to explain the inability thus far of the CP to
break into the Cape. They include the maintenance by the NP of a
solid organizational base under the national leadership of a Cape
Nationalist during the 1980s. The racial demographic composition
of the Capea with the rather limited numbers of blacks in the
greater part of the Cape, has probably also served to constrain
or underplay white fears, to the disadvantage of the right wing.
The CP in fact only won two seats in the Cape in the 1989
election - Kuruman and Uitenhage.
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Major changes have occurred in recent times including the fact
that party leadership is no longer Cape-based and very rapid In-
migration of black people into the western Cape has taken place.
Indications since the election accordingly suggest some growth on
the part of the CP. The results of the two by-elections in the
Cape in December in Vasco and Ceres (see Table 5) suggest a
fairly substantial CP growth although the reduced percentage
polls and the problems of interpreting voter behaviour in by
election conditions, may exaggerate the real rate of growth.
VASCO
CERES
TABLE 5
VASCO AND CERES BY ELECTION RESULTS
SEPTEMBER 1989 DECEMBER 1989
4185
2922
1243
44,5
4514
2944
1570
70,0
NP
CP
NP MAJORITY
POLL
NP
CP
NP MAJORITY
POLL
6544
2645
3899
56,9
5390
2871
2519
77,4
The same trend is apparent from the results of a March 1990
municipal by election in Kimberley where the votes were as
follows:
October 1988
March 1990
NP
668 (54%)
290 (38%)
TABLE 6
CP
330 (27Z)
483 (62%)
IND
234 (19%) (Total - 1232)
(Total - 773)
Here we see that the decline In support for the NP, despite the
absence of opposition from an independent, was greater than the
decline in the percentage poll.
15
The Rapport polls between June 1989 and February 1990,
notwithstanding an apparent (but presumably consistent) under-
representation of right wing support, referred to later, also
reflect a growth trend for the CP nationally:
NP
CP
DP
HNP
DO NOT VOTE
(Rapport 7 January
TABLE
FEB 1990
46,3
31,0
18.3
0,6
3,8
and 25 February
7
NOV 1989
41,6
27,6
24,6
0,8
5,4
1990)
JUN 1989
41,1
23,9
28,2
1,0
5,6
Thus, it would appear that indications of the CP having reached a
ceiling of around 33 percent of the electorate may have been
confined to the pre-February assumptions concerning the reform
process and white voter security. Although the CP does not
appear to have yet grown beyond this boundary at the national
level, there are indications that it may yet grow well beyond
this limit in particular types of constituencies.
If we take the Transvaal as a model of where the CP is most
established and active, it appears that its average level of
support varies between constituencies according to predominant
home language, urban/rural status and socio-economic class
distinctions. CP support is, on average, at the following levels
in each of a number of categories of constituencies:
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Large urban constituencies
Upper middle class 10 %
English-speaking middle class 26 %
English lower-middle/emerging middle
class (students and young family areas) 11 %
Afrikaans-speaking or mixed middle class 41 %
Afrikaans or mixed lower-middle/working class 52 %
Rural and smaller urban constituencies
Large town areas 53 %
Small town areas 57 %
From the above it would appear that the CP's potential for growth
is probably limited to predominantly Afrikaans speaking or
linguistically mixed constituencies. The regional
differentiation in CP support remains a significant factor yet it
could, as we have indicated, be starting to overcome this past
barrier to growth, enabling it to achieve the typical levels of
support in different types of Transvaal constituencies on a
nation-wide basis.
Applying the above "Transvaal model" of CP levels of support to
constituencies in the other three provinces, likewise classifed
by the variables of language, class and urban/rural distinctions,
we estimate that the CP could thus attain some 41,63 percent of
the national vote. This would apply even if CP strength in the
Transvaal remains constant at 1989 levels.
We are suggesting, thus, that the level of support for the CP in
the constituency types given above for the Transvaal could
potentially apply in all areas once conservative parties have
fully established their viewpoints, organisational presence and
access to social networks of influence. This has clearly
occurred in the Transvaal and substantially in the Orange Free
State. It has not yet occurred in the Cape and Natal.
Changed over-arching political circumstances, and possibly
heightened white voter insecurity, in particular, may make it
possible for the CP to exploit basic voter interests and
attitudes within types of constituencies in which they have
operated at a disadvantage in the past.
One final indication of future prospects is derived from the
Market and Opinion Surveys (Pty) Ltd. poll in November 1989 among
its nation-wide panel of 1458 registered voters. It should be
noted that this panel has consistently under-represented right
wing opposition support, due to more-or-less inevitable under-
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representation of geographically mobile white working class
voters and socially marginal peri-urban fringe voters, inter
alia. For example, support for right wing parties was estimated
at 24,9 percent in a June 1989 poll and 28,4 percent in November
compared with the result of 31 percent in the September 1989
election. One may cautiously assume that the November result
could be adjusted upwards by 31,4/28,4 = 1,106, say 11 percent.
(It could be adjusted upward even more if one takes the June pre-
election poll as a basis for the correction.)
In the November opinion poll voters in the sample were asked
whether or not F.W. de Klerk, in regard to the pace of political
reform, was moving "too fast", "too slowly", or "just right".
Note that this poll was conducted before the recent announcements
unbanning the ANC and PAC and the release of Nelson Mandela. In
this poll 14 percent of National Party supporters indicated that
de Klerk was moving too fast. This proportion is likely to have
increased since November and one might assume, therefore, that at
least this 14 percent would be tempted to defect to a CP position
in a hypothetical referendum or election. If that were to occur,
and correcting for the under-representation of right wing
supporters in the poll, as calculated above, it would imply 38
percent support for the right wing opposition nation-wide.
This level of support, in a hypothetical general election, would
most certainly ensure a "hung" parliament, with no absolute
majority for the NP. It would not, however, ensure a defeat of
any proposals put forward by de Klerk In a referendum, since, as
said before, most DP supporters would be likely to back the
proposals.
Due to the absence of any similar estimates since November,
reactions to the most recent moves by government cannot be
assessed. A February poll by Market and Opinion Surveys suggests
a growth in "pessimism" among white voters of some 6 percent of
the electorate since 1985. But this result is not sufficiently
specific to allow for interpretations relating to party support.
Suffice it to say that the postulated 14 percent defection to the
right wing position Is, if anything, likely to be an under
estimate in the light of subsequent events.
SOME TENTATIVE ASSESSMENTS
Taking all these indications into account, one might conclude
that de Klerk could fairly confidently expect to vindicate his
interpreted mandate in a referendum, albeit with likely DP
support. He would be rather less advised to call a white general
election if conditions prevailing at the time and the
implications of whatever political agreement has been negotiated
spell uncertainty and political risk for white voters. With a
re-delimitation of seats, and given his now established ability
to give positive signals to the majority-based formations as well
as providing substantial reassurances to assuage minority fears,
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he probably could win an election but the win would probably be
very narrow. This expected victory would probably be achieved
either due to substantial numbers of former DP supporters
deciding to vote for the NP, or through a formal alliance with
the DP. De Klerk would most probably not wish to enter into
whatever new constitutional arrangement is negotiated with less
than an overall majority of white support, and this would be in
doubt in an election.
Among the many interesting uncertainties of the present process
of transition, the factor of white voter responses is as
difficult to predict as any other. Our analysis suggests that
this factor will not prove to be a decisive constraint in the
search for a political settlement. At the same time however,
complacency would be ill-advised. Perhaps the most telling
gesture De Klerk could make in this regard is the reassurance
that he will support the right of responsible right wing
formations to have a place at the negotiating table and that he
will promote the view that any realistic proposals from this
quarter will be fully considered. Without these reassurances the
right-wing movements are likely to mobilise very intensively to
exploit the possible trends in the electorate that our analysis
has suggested.
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ALBANY
CAPE TOWN GARDENS
CLAREMONT
CONSTANTIA
GREEN POINT
GROOTE SCHUUR
PINELANDS
PE CENTRAL
SEA POINT
SIMONSTOWN
WALMER
WYNBERG
BEZUIDENHOUT
BRYANSTON
EDENVALE
HILLBROW
HOUGHTON
JHB NORTH
NORTH RAND
PARKTOWN
RANDBURG
SANDTON
YEOVILLE
BEREA
DBN CENTRAL
DBN NORTH
GREYTOWN
MOOI RIVER
PMB NORTH
PMB SOUTH
PINETOWN
UMBILO
UMHLANGA
ANNEXURE 1
1989 DP SEATS
1987
NP
PFP
PFP
PFP
PFP
PFP
PFP
PFP
PFP
198
PFP
PFP
PFP
PFP
PFP
PFP
PFP
PFP
PFP
NP
NP
NP
NP
PFP
NP
NP
PFP
PFP
NP
PFP
NP
PFP
PFP
PFP
PFP
PFP
PFP
PFP
NP
NP
PFP
NP
NP
NP
PFP
PFP
PFP
PFP
PFP
PFP
PFP
PFP
NP
SPLIT
SPLIT
SPLIT
VOTE
VOTE
VOTE
PFP
NP
PFP
PFP
PFP
PFP
NRP
PFP
NRP
PFP
PFP
PFP
NRP
NRP
SPLIT VOTE
SPLIT VOTE
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ANNEXURE 2
NEW CP SEATS 1989
KURUMAN
UITENHAGE
HERCULES
LYDENBURG
MARAISBURG
MEYERTON SPLIT VOTE
PRETORIA WEST
ROODEPLAAT
RUSTENBURG
STILFONTEIN
WONDERBOOM
HEILBRON
LADYBRAND SPLIT VOTE
PARYS
SASOLBURG
SMITHFIELD
WELKOM
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